Overview of Stability
Unified Action Partners
Tactical Actions and Tasks in Support of Stability
Stability components of an operation leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment, facilitate reconciliation between local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority. This chapter discusses Infantry rifle platoon and squad support to stability tasks; it addresses tactical actions and tasks in support of stability, planning considerations and transitions. (Refer to ADRP 3-07 for more information.).
4-1. Unified land operations require continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development (FM 3-07). Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment; provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).
4-2. As combat operations culminate, part of the force secures critical infrastructure and populated areas. Protecting or preventing further harm to the civilian population are legal obligations of military forces during operations. However, if a unit is decisively engaged in conducting combat tasks, it should not divert from mission accomplishment to perform stability tasks, until the situation permits. If unable to perform minimum essential stability tasks, the unit should inform higher headquarters and continue with its mission as assigned. (Refer to ADRP 3-07 for more information.)
4-3. Leaders plan to minimize the effects of combat on the populace. Properly focused, executed stability tasks prevent population centers from degenerating into civil unrest and becoming recruiting areas for opposition movements or insurgencies.
4-4. An Infantry platoon and squads are not capable of achieving the desired end state of stability tasks independently. They support stability tasks by performing platoon and squad-level missions, tasks, and activities supporting the stability tasks of its higher headquarters often partnered and working closely with other unified action partners.
4-5. A stability framework based on conditions within the area of operations of initial response, transformation, and fostering stability, helps the unit determine the required training and task organization of forces prior to initial deployment, and serves as a guide to actions in an operation focused on stability tasks. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for more information.) Stability tasks occur in three phases described in the following paragraphs. These phases facilitate identifying lead responsibilities and determining priorities and describe the conditions on the operational environment.
INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE
4-6. These actions generally reflect activity executed to stabilize a crisis state in the area of operations. Army conventional force units typically perform initial response actions during, or directly after, a conflict or disaster in which the security situation prohibits the introduction of civilian personnel. Initial response actions aim to provide a secure environment that allows relief forces to attend to the immediate humanitarian needs of the local population. They reduce the level of violence and human suffering while creating conditions that enable other actors to participate safely in relief efforts.
4-7. Stabilization, reconstruction, and capacity-building are transformation phase actions that are performed in a relatively secure environment. Transformation phase actions take place in either crisis or vulnerable states. There is the presence of a legitimate authority either interim or established as well as indigenous host nation security forces. These actions aim to build host-nation capacity across multiple sectors. Transformation phase actions are essential to the continuing stability of the environment. These actions are essential to fostering stability within the area.
FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY PHASE
4-8. These are actions that encompass long-term efforts, which capitalize on capacity building and reconstruction activities. Successful accomplishment of these actions establishes conditions that enable sustainable development. Usually military forces perform fostering sustainability phase actions only when the security environment is stable enough to support efforts to implement the long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and economy of the host nation. Often military forces conduct these long-term efforts to support broader, civilian-led efforts.
4-9. Army forces conduct the following five primary stability tasks: civil security, civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. At brigade level and below, the primary stability tasks are too broad to focus effort appropriately; at lower tactical echelons, lines of effort are best designed using standard mission-essential tasks. Lines of effort may focus on specific aspects of the local situation, such as the restoration of essential civil services. There, activities of military forces often are shaped using lines of effort based on (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, security, and other considerations) while addressing the need to provide food aid and shelter.
ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY
4-10. Establishing civil security involves providing for safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats; it is essential to providing a safe and secure environment. Civil security includes a diverse set of activities. These range from enforcing peace agreements to conducting disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and includes biometric identity data collection to identify criminal elements, known and suspected terrorists, and other irregular forces.
4-11. Subordinate platoons of the Infantry company execute stability tasks for the Infantry battalion. Until a legitimate civil government can assume responsibility for the security, military forces perform the tasks associated with civil security. At the same time, they help develop host nation security and police forces. Normally, the responsibility for establishing and maintaining civil security belongs to military forces from the onset of operations through transition, when host nation security and police forces assume this role.
ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL
4-12. Establishing civil control is an initial step toward instituting rule of law and stable governance. Although establishing civil security is the first responsibility of military forces in stability, this can only be accomplished by also restoring civil control. Internal threats may manifest themselves as an insurgency, subversive elements within the population, organized crime, or general lawlessness.
4-13. Civil control regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups. This control reduces risk to individuals or groups and promotes security. Curfews and traffic checkpoints, together with biometric identity data collection, are examples of civil control.
SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE
4-15. Stability tasks establish conditions enabling interagency and host nation actions to succeed. Military forces focus on transferring control to a legitimate civil authority according to the desired end state. At the platoon and squad level, supports to governance tasks are dependent on those of the Infantry battalion and IBCT. Those tasks focus primarily on continuing civil security and civil control operations to provide a safe and secure environment. As in other stability tasks, leader and Soldier engagement with local officials and the population are ongoing.
4-16. Company level and below tasks commonly support external agencies along specific themes nested with higher efforts. Targeted civil reconnaissance, and in some cases surveillance of the population, groups, and institutions, is ongoing to monitor the efficacy of programs, policies, and procedures established by a transitional or civil authority. Early identification of developing problems provides a means to focus additional tasks and available resources to support the appropriate authority before becoming a source of instability and dissent among the populace.
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
4-17. Support to economic and infrastructure development helps a host nation develop capability and capacity in these areas. It may involve direct and indirect military assistance to local, regional, and national entities. At the rifle platoon and squad level, support to economic and infrastructure development focuses primarily on continuing civil security and civil control operations in order to provide a safe and secure environment that allows external agencies to leverage their capabilities.
4-18. As in other stability tasks, leader and Soldier engagement with local officials and the population are ongoing. At the company and below these efforts are commonly in coordination with external agencies in order to identify the economic and infrastructure development needs at the local level and match those needs with available programs and funding sources.
4-19. The small unit leader plans for stability in a manner similar to the offense and defense. The planning process is continuous, constantly adapting as the conditions of the operational environment are shaped by activities, both natural and human. Often planning for the next mission begins simultaneously as assessing the previous mission during stability. The leader must be aware of more than the accomplishment of the mission but also the manner in which it was conducted and the sentiment the population had during its execution. The resultant plan must foster flexibility, initiative, and adaptability in the face of unforeseen events. The following warfighting functions discuss planning considerations and activities critical for mission success.
4-20. Stability tasks tend to be decentralized in nature, over extended distances. As such, Infantry unit activities will consist largely of unrelated small-unit operations conducted across an assigned area of operation. Units must conduct these operations with consistency, impartiality, and discipline to encourage cooperation from unified action partners for a cohesive effort.
4-21. Stability tasks, more so than offensive and defensive tasks, present a unique challenge. Where offense and defense typically focuses on the defeat of an enemy force, stability focuses on the people. In setting the tone for planning, the Infantry leader provides─
The intent and planning guidance.
Concept of operation.
4-22. The platoon leader must clearly understand mission, situation, commander’s intent and he must ensure his subordinate units understand as well. He must plan for continuous operations, and, as with offense and defense, planning and preparation time is often limited. The plan must facilitate adjustment based upon changes in the situation. Additional considerations and activities include—
Civil-military operations (CMO).
Civil affairs operations.
Military information support operations (MISO).
Rules of engagement. (See chapter 1, section I of this publication for more information.)
Rules of interaction, which includes:
Augmentation. Required individual augmentees and augmentation cells to support force-tailoring requirements and personnel shortfalls. Augmentation supports coordination with the media, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, other multinational forces, and civil-military elements. Analyses of METT-TC drive augmentation.
Liaison. Task-organized small liaison teams to deal with situations that develop with the local population. Depending the situation requirements, unit ministry, engineers, MISO, civil affairs, counterintelligence , linguistics, and logistics personnel may be task-organized to make up these liaison teams. These teams can free up maneuver elements (may require security from platoon) and facilitate negotiation. Negotiation teams must have linguists and the personnel who have the authority to negotiate.
Operations with outside agencies. Includes other U.S. armed services or government agencies as well as international organizations (including nongovernmental organizations, coalition, and United Nation military forces or agencies). Coordination and integration of civilian and military activities must take place at every level. Coordinating centers such as the civil-military operations center are designed to accomplish this task. These operations centers should include representatives from as many agencies as required.
Media. Soldiers must be aware of current media reports from about the area and be willing to work with journalists in efforts to promote good relationship and combat false information. Involvement with media should be coordinated under public affairs guidance.
THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING CULTURE
4-23. Soldiers derive their effectiveness from their ability to understand and work with foreign counterparts from another culture. They need to understand enough of their own culture and their counterpart’s culture to accurately convey ideas, concepts, and purpose without causing counterproductive consequences. Soldiers need to be aware of aspects of the local culture and history that influence behavior in their operational environment. Soldiers need to understand the reasons and motivations underlying personal interaction and practice patience when working with their counterparts. Group norms guide individual behavior, and Soldiers need to understand how individuals in a society tend to interact as members of a group, whether a race, ethnic, or kinship group. Cultural understanding is not derived from demographic information provided to the military through country briefs prior to deployment. It is gained from studying, interacting, and understanding the people, religion, history, customs, and social and political structures within an area. For true understanding, it is necessary to live among the people, gradually understanding the subtleties and nuances of their culture. Leaders in the Infantry company ensure that Soldiers understand that the actions of one can have a positive or negative effect in the way that the entire unit is viewed by the local population. (Refer to ATP 3-07.10 for more information.)
THEMES, MESSAGES, AND ACTIONS
4-24. Leaders use their own themes and messages to support their narratives. Narratives are tied to actions in their operational environments and area of operations. A narrative is a brief description of a leader’s story used to visualize effects the leader wants to achieve in the information environment to support and shape their operational environments. An effective leader’s theme supports overarching U.S. Government and higher headquarters themes, has details, and is tailored to environmental conditions in their area of operations.
4-25. Themes are planning tools that guide development of the narrative, messages, and other information products (talking points, MISO objectives, and public affairs guidance). Themes represent broad ideas the leader wants to convey to selected audiences. Themes are not communicated to selected audiences, messages are. Themes are broad and enduring, and as such, they do not change frequently.
4-26. They can be verbal, written, gestured, or electronic communications supporting a theme focused on an audience. They support a specific action or objective. Messages are tailored to specific audiences. Leaders use messages to communicate clear information and, if necessary, elicit a response or change in behavior. Messages are situation and mission dependent. Command information messages convey local leaders’ policies and intent to their subordinates.
4-27. The public affairs officer develops command information and public information messages. Army public information is information of a military nature, the dissemination of which is consistent with security and the DOD principles of information. Command information is communication from the commander to help members of the command understand organizational goals, operations, and significant developments. (Refer to FM 3-61 for more information.)
4-28. Psychological messages convey specific information to selected foreign audiences to influence their perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. The military information support planner or unit develops these messages. MISO messages and actions support themes established in the approved MISO program for that particular mission. (Refer to JP 3-13.2 and ADRP 3-05 for detailed information on MISO.)
Actions Reinforce Messages
4-29. Leaders consider perceptions and ramifications of their actions to gain and maintain support of populations in conflict areas. Leaders first understand host-nation laws and cultures, enabling them to operate effectively in the information environment. Second, leaders determine how to inform audiences at home, gain support abroad, and generate support or empathy for missions in their area of operations.
4-30. Leaders use information to marginalize or defeat adversary or enemy information efforts by shaping attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences residing in area of operations. Synchronized themes, messages, and actions support the leader’s operational goals by integrating words, images, and deeds to avoid confusion or information fratricide.
LINES OF EFFORT
4-31. All activities in the information environment communicate in some way. They serve to make an impression on minds of those that observe or hear those communications. Leaders and staffs distinguish the two lines of effort by intention of the communicator and the message. Sometimes, a communication intended merely to inform might eventually lead to a changed opinion or behavior. A communication designed to influence may not achieve the desired outcome. (Refer to FM 3-13 for more information.)
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
4-32. Movement and maneuver stability tasks are similar to the offense and defense with extensive emphasis on security and engagement skills (negotiation, rapport building, cultural awareness, and critical language phrases). The intent is to create a stable environment allowing peace to take hold while ensuring the force is protected.
4-33. Movement and maneuver often is decentralized to the small unit level. At company level, the commander works stability problems collectively with subordinate platoon leaders who own the ground in the area of operation, sharing understanding and exploring possible solutions. Once leaders understand the situation, seeking consensus helps subordinates understand the commander’s intent. Subordinates exercise initiative and act based on the commander’s intent informed by whatever situational awareness they have developed.
4-34. Leaders must be prepared to rely on direct and indirect fire support, protection, and sustainment elements to assist movement and maneuver. When new requirements develop, these same elements must be ready to shift priorities.
4-35. Establishing the force’s presence in the area of operation is often the first requirement of the platoon’s stability mission. Being on the ground establishes links with the local populace. Through Soldier engagement, the populace begins to trust and relate to friendly forces. Driving around in an armored convoy may degrade situational awareness. It can make Soldiers targets and often is more dangerous than moving on foot and remaining close to the populace.
4-36. Upon arrival in the area of operation, it may not be advisable to go straight for the main aggressor stronghold or to try to take on villages that support criminal forces or other hostile actors. Start from secure areas and work gradually outward. Extend influence through local networks. First, win the confidence of a few villages, and then work with those with whom they trade, intermarry, or do business. This tactic develops local allies, a mobilized populace, and trusted networks.
4-37. Seek a victory early during stability to demonstrate dominance of the area of operation. This does not require a combat victory. Often victories can be attained by building relationships than by combat. Early combat without accurate situational understanding may create unnecessary collateral damage and ill will. Instead, victories may involve using leader engagement to resolve a long-standing issue or co-opt a key local leader. Achieving even a small early victory can set the tone for the mission and help commanders seize the initiative.
4-38. The platoon may be tasked to establish a quick reaction force for the security of checkpoints, outposts, observation post, and work sites, and to support patrols, meetings, and convoys in the area of operation. Planning should provide a force of the appropriate size for a quick reaction force to separate local hostile parties before potential violent situations grow out of control. The force must have the ability to respond anywhere in the area of operation, and be rapidly reinforced by augmentation and maneuver elements.
4-39. Mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering capabilities support critical tasks applied through the movement and maneuver warfighting function. These capabilities provide a major role in protecting positions, headquarters, support facilities, base camps, and highly vulnerable assets.
4-40. Intelligence plays an important role in the accomplishment of any stability task. The small unit leader uses all available information collection to help accomplish the mission. Every member of the platoon plays a role in gathering information to support higher echelon planning. The company commander uses his CoIST to produce actionable intelligence for his subordinate unit. The CoIST manages the information collection effort to ensure every member of the company headquarters and its subordinate units understands the operational environment and plays an active role in the development of the common operational picture. (Refer to FM 3-21.10 for more information.)
4-41. During stability, threats must be identified and decisive points defined. Leaders focus information collection activities to identify sources of instability. Platoon tasks will have different requirements, time frames, ROE, and other differences influencing what information collection is required in order to provide recommendations or decisions for platoon and higher echelon planning. Predictive assessment contributes to future planning and force disposition the end state and its defining conditions for every task. (Refer to FM 3-55 for more information.)
4-42. Collaboration and interaction with local populace is essential. Once the platoon occupies an area of operation, its next task is to build trust and relationships with the local populace. Relationships are built with community leaders and local security forces. Over time, these relationships may lead to partnership and collaboration in support with stability tasks.
4-43. Threat mitigation during stability is intelligence driven. The platoon often develops much of its own intelligence in relation to the amount they receive from higher headquarters. Small unit leaders organize their assets to collect local information unavailable to higher sources of intelligence. Linguists are important in the collection of local information, but like any other scarce resource, must be allocated and utilized effectively. Biometrics collections and its use prior to conducting essential tasks or activities enhance protection. Soldiers utilizing biometrically enabled watchlist (BEWL) loaded on handheld devices or other biometrics collect/match systems can identify individuals via prior biometric enrollments so that regardless of who they say they are their identities are known with certainty. Social network analysis and other analytical tools can be useful for promoting situational understanding of the operational environment for stability tasks as well as counterinsurgency. (Refer to FM 3-24.2 for more information.)
4-44. Civil reconnaissance (See chapter 6, section III of this publication) focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which may best be represented by ASCOPE. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by civil affairs personnel or by other forces, as required. It differs from other reconnaissance in that it usually is not targeted at a specific enemy; instead, it focuses on answering information requirements for civil situation awareness.
4-45. Although indirect fire support planning for stability is the same as for offense and defense, the use of indirect fire support may be very restricted and limited. (See appendix C of this publication for more information.) The Infantry leader integrates indirect fire support into his plan considering the ROE. The ROE may impose restrictions on the use of certain munitions and detail release authority/strike approval authorization. Special considerations include the following:
Procedures for rapid clearance of fires.
Close communication and coordination with host country officials.
Increased security for indirect firing positions.
Restricted use of certain munitions such as dual purpose improved conventional munitions, area denial artillery munitions, or remote antiarmor mine.
The following video depicts intelligence during stability
4-46. The operational environment the Infantry platoon and squad operates in during stability may be very austere, creating special sustainment considerations. (See chapter 7 of this publication for more information.) These factors include, but are not limited to, the following─
Reliance on local procurement of certain items.
Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supply materials, and lubricants.
Special Class V supply requirements.
Reliance on bottled water.
Class IV supplies for construction of fixed observation posts and checkpoints.
Use of existing facilities or new construction for quarters; water, sewer, and power utilities; reinforced hardstand areas for maintenance.
Barriers or berms to protect ammunition and fuel.
Use of female Soldiers in the forward support company to assist with searching host-nation female suspects.
Class IX items.
U.S. Soldier delivers pallets of water.
4-47. Protection of the force during stability is essential for success at all levels. Infantry leaders continually balance protection needs between military forces and civil populations. Frequent interaction between U.S. forces and local population make protection planning difficult and essential. Threats often blend in with the local populace during stability and are difficult to identify, making heightened levels of awareness the norm. The close proximity of civilians and Soldiers also can promote health issues (such as communicable disease) through close contact with local civilians, detainees, or local foods.
4-48. The protection of civil institutions, processes, and systems required to reach the end state conditions of stability strategy often can be the most decisive factor in stability because its accomplishment is essential for long-term success. Civil areas typically contain structured and prepared routes, roadways, and avenues canalizing traffic. This can lead to predictable friendly movement patterns that maybe exploited by the enemy. An additional planning consideration during stability tasks is to protect the force while using the minimum force consistent with the approved ROE. Additional protection considerations during stability include─
Reducing the unexploded ordnance and mine threat in the area of operations.
Fratricide and friendly fire prevention and minimizing escalation of force (EOF) incidents through combat, civilian, and coalition identification measures.
Developing rapid and efficient personnel recovery techniques and drills.
Clear operations security procedures account for close proximity of civilians, nongovernmental organizations, and contractors.
Disciplined information management techniques to preserve access to computer networks.
Containment of toxic industrial materiel is present in the civilian environment.
Survivability requirements for static facilities, positions, or outposts.
4-49. Small unit leaders must implement appropriate security measures to protect the force. Establishment of checkpoints, base camp security procedures, and aggressive patrolling are examples of protecting the force. Protecting the force requires special considerations in stability tasks. This is because threats may be different and, in some cases, opposing forces seek to kill or wound U.S. Soldiers, or destroy or damage property for political purposes.
4-50. Leaders must always consider the aspects of protection and how they relate to the ROE. Some examples of protective measures are─
Secure the inside perimeter if the host nation secures the outside perimeter.
Avoid becoming an easy target and do not become predictable.
Include security in each plan, SOP, operations order, and movement order.
Develop specific security programs such as threat awareness and operational security.
Restrict access of unassigned personnel to the unit's location.
Constantly maintain an image of professionalism and readiness.
Base the degree of security established on a continuous threat assessment.
4-51. The Army protects human and automated decisionmaking in peacetime and in conflict using OPSEC. It’s a leader’s responsibility supported by Soldiers, supporting civilian staff members and operators. OPSEC enhances mission success by preserving advantages of secrecy and surprise. OPSEC is a force multiplier. It includes reducing predictability and eliminating indicators of operations. Leaders use OPSEC countermeasures to deny adversaries knowledge of friendly operations. This requires adversaries to expend more resources to obtain critical information needed to make decisions. (Refer to ADRP 3-37 for more information on OPSEC.)
U.S. Soldiers conduct traffic control operations at a checkpoint.
Human Terrain Teams
Military Information Support Operations
Host Nation Partners
4-52. Unified action partners are military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Unified action partners can include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and U.S. government agencies and departments.
4-53. Civil affairs forces support leaders by engaging civil component (interagency, indigenous population and institutions, host nation, intergovernmental organizations or private sector) of an operational environment conducting civil affairs operations and support to the commander's civil-military operations. Civil affairs forces ensure sustained legitimacy of the mission and transparency and credibility of the military force before, during, or after other military missions. This support involves applying specialty skills (normally responsibility of a local, regional, or national government) to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. As they relate to information related capabilities civil affairs operations and civil-military operations differ in purpose, focus, and specialization. Civil-military operations are a leader’s activities establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations among military forces, governmental, nongovernmental civilian organizations, authorities, and civilians.
HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS
4-54. Human terrain teams fully integrate into unit staffs and conduct field research among the local population. Human terrain teams consist of five or six military and civilian personnel, and include one team leader, one or two social scientists, one research manager, and one or two analysts with specific local knowledge. Human terrain teams are considered subject matter experts in the local area and culture and are primarily involved with non-lethal unit activities. These teams maintain social and political networks and can be an invaluable resource to a leader to build general situational awareness. When possible, teams deploy with at least one female to facilitate access to the often inaccessible female population. Often a platoon or squad is detailed to transport, provide security, or other support to these teams.
4-55. Public affairs operations fulfill the Army’s obligation to keep the American people and Army informed. They help to establish conditions leading to confidence in the Army and its readiness to conduct unified land operations. Public affairs operations strive to enhance public understanding and garner American, as well as global, support for the Army by engaging with both domestic and foreign media entities. (Refer to FM 3-61.1)
MISSION AND OPERATIONS
4-56. Public affairs Soldiers accomplish their mission through public information, command information, and public engagement. Public information focuses on informing external audiences. It primarily engages media and key audiences to convey Army and command themes and messages to global and American audiences. Command information focuses on internal audiences—Soldiers, civilians, and family members—who recognize that an informed force is a more ready, reliable, and resilient force. Public engagement places special emphasis on two-way communication with identified publics and communities surrounding military installations. It recognizes a positive rapport between the Army and its host communities is mutually beneficial, supporting the Army as an institution as well as its individual Soldiers.
4-57. Integrating public affairs with other information-related capabilities helps leaders shape the information environment, provides valuable media assessment, and counters enemy propaganda and disinformation. Public affairs operations support the leader’s development of themes and messages and collaborate with other information-related capabilities to protect OPSEC and avoid information fratricide.
4-58. Public affairs Soldiers participate in information-related capability and information integration process in the information operations element by continually assessing media information environment to determine the degree and nature of media coverage. They take steps to correct misinformation and propaganda. They also seek to leverage other information-related capabilities—such as combat camera or civil affairs operations— to provide greater accuracy, context, and characterization while informing. Additionally, public affairs operations provide reinforcing messaging for other information-related capabilities actions and the overarching strategic communication.
4-59. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every Soldier involved in all operations. All leaders and Soldiers must know how to deal effectively with broadcast and print reporters and photographers. This should include an understanding of subjects they are authorized to discuss and subjects the public affairs officer must address.
4-60. The objective of the Infantry battalion commander in dealing with the media is to ensure that operations are presented to the public in proper context. All leaders and soldiers must know how to deal effectively with reporters and photographers. They should understand which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to the public affairs officer.
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS
4-61. Military information support operations are the leader’s primary capability to inform and influence foreign populations in areas of operations. Military information support Soldiers conduct operations to induce or reinforce specific attitudes and behaviors favorable to U.S. military objectives. (Refer to FM 3-53 for more information).
4-62. Military information support Soldiers provide subject matter expertise in the information operations. As primary members of the information operations working group, they advise, plan, provide operations oversight, and assess messages and actions having potential or actual psychological effects. Military information support units also provide analysis, development, production, distribution, and dissemination capabilities for MISO and are the primary executors for purposes of informing and influencing target audiences. Military information support Soldiers, provide dedicated intelligence support can also provide post-delivery measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. The information operations element utilizes military information support analyses of audiences and their environments. The information operations element also assesses adversary information and capability, including information for effects, misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda.
4-63. Military information support planners and attached military information support units help leaders in executing Soldier and leader engagement efforts in areas of operations. Military information support Soldiers are trained, educated, equipped, and organized to plan, monitor, and assess engagement with foreign populations and select audiences. This engagement includes planning engagements with foreign populations, leaders, key communicators, and others with specific intent to influence to support leader objectives. Military information support planners plan, manage, and assess Soldier and leader engagement efforts. They support the leader’s larger engagement strategy.
4-64. Combat camera video specialists provide leaders with still and video imagery capabilities to support operational and planning requirements. These forces use video documentation capabilities ranging from aerial to underwater photography. They access areas and events inaccessible to other personnel or media. Furthermore, combat camera teams have a technological capability to transmit real-time images in turn serve to reinforce other information-related capability efforts. Likewise, their documentation of operations provides imagery support countering misinformation or propaganda.
HOST NATION PARTNERS
4-65. Host-nation partners may include military, police, border, intelligence, paramilitary, and other security elements such as militias or private security companies. Other potential partners may include hostnation government representatives and agencies, tribal leaders, and influential private citizens.
4-66. If present in the host nation, intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, African Union, European Union, and others can be valuable partners for stabilization and reconstruction because of their knowledge of the local situation, ties, and experience. They may have military or nonmilitary components and will operate under their own mandates and direction. Their forces may be best suited for a relatively benign peacekeeping role and less militarily capable than U.S. Army units, but they are generally perceived as legitimate by a wide range of actors. By maintaining a safe and secure environment, nonmilitary organizations—such as the United Nations World Food Program and World Health Organization—often prove vital in providing humanitarian assistance and development. Enabling such organizations may be one of the most important stability objectives. Although U.S. forces often view nongovernmental organizations as partners to be integrated, most nongovernmental organizations prefer a clearly neutral posture and avoid being associated with any military force.
Protect Critical Sites and Personnel
Tasks the Platoon Can Support for Other Forces
Tasks the Platoon Monitors
4-67. During stability, the Infantry platoon and squad provide support to facilitate the execution of tasks for which the host nation normally is responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military forces. However, military forces sometimes provide logistic, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. Tasks the Infantry platoon and squad performs generally will fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with a stability task:
Tasks for which the platoon retains primary responsibility.
Tasks the platoon supports other forces.
Tasks the platoon monitors.
4-68.Established to preserve freedom of movement to; position fire support assets, conduct mission command operations, provide for sustainment operations, prevent threat ground reconnaissance, and prevent threat ground maneuver forces from penetrating defensive perimeters established by the platoon leader. (See appendix D, section I of this publication for more information.) Area security missions require a significant amount of time and normally operate from outposts such as a base camp or combat outposts. Like an AA or defensive strongpoint, the base camp also provides some protection because it requires all-round security. (Refer to FM 3-21.10 for more information.)
4-69. To add security, aid in information gathering and provide for a strong presence in an operation area. Security patrols and civil reconnaissance usually occur in urban areas and leaders must be aware of the ROE and the purpose of the patrol. (Refer to chapter 6 of this publication for more information.)
4-70. Establish observation posts are created for a specified time and purpose. Some observation posts are overt (clearly visible) and deliberately constructed. Others are covert and designed to observe an area or target without the knowledge of the local population. Each type of observation post must be integrated into supporting direct and indirect fire plans and into the overall observation plan. (See appendix D, section II of this publication for more information.)
4-71. Checkpoints are another technique used to provide area security and gain information. To establish a checkpoint to achieve one or more of the following: control movement, obtain information, disrupt enemy movement or actions. (See appendix D, section III of this publication for more information.)
4-72. Convoy escort is a task to provide close-in protection from direct fire while on the move. Infantry forces must be augmented with additional transportation assets to carry out this mission. (See appendix D, section IV of this publication for more information.)
4-73. To conduct search operations or to employ search procedures is a continuous requirement. A search can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. (Refer to chapter 6 of this publication for more information.) Techniques include Search and Attach and Cordon and Search. Often during these tasks, site exploitation is conducted.
4-74. Site exploitation is the synchronized and integrated application of scientific and technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, and support host-nation rule of law. (ATP 3-90.15) Site exploitation is guided by the unit’s information collection plan. (Refer to JP 2-0 and FM 3‑55) on doctrine pertaining to information collection and collection planning.) The information collection plan enables the commander to focus assets on collecting information to answer specific information requirements. (ATP 3-90.15)
4-75. Primarily, site exploitation is a means of gaining information supporting the intelligence process. Site exploitation missions doctrine emphasizes three purposes:
To answer information requirements (usually the commander’s critical information requirements).
To facilitate subsequent missions (already planned or not yet anticipated).
To facilitate criminal prosecution by host nation, coalition, or international authorities (related to war crimes).
4-76. Site exploitation missions may focus on one fundamental purpose or involve all three simultaneously. The purpose of the site exploitation should be considered throughout TLP. The development of intelligence, through immediate analysis or off site processing can enable the leader to target additional objectives. At the platoon level, many of the site exploitation related activities answer higher headquarters information requirements.
4-77. Site exploitation forces provide critical data for inclusion in the intelligence process, which subsequently supports operations already planned or not yet anticipated. They identify information, materiel, and persons of interest, collect and preserve these items, and, after the mission is completed, debriefed by appropriate intelligence representatives, usually the S-2 or CoIST. The information (in any medium or form), materiel, and persons collected are processed by the appropriate agencies and analyzed to produce intelligence supporting ongoing or subsequent operations.
4-78. During stability tasks, units can use site exploitation to gain information supporting criminal prosecution by host nation authorities. Clearly documenting the details surrounding the initial detention, preserving evidence, and maintaining chain of custody are critical and aid in determining if further detention is warranted, in classifying the detainee, in developing intelligence, and in prosecuting detainees suspected of committing criminal acts. Documentation should be detailed and answer the six Ws—who, what, when, where, why, and witnesses. Record these details on the DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag), DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement ), DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document ), and locally developed forms if necessary. (Refer to ATP 3-90.15 for more information.)
PROTECT CRITIAL SITES AND PERSONNEL
4-79. Certain locations within the area of operation may be identified as critical and require protection. This may be a facility or infrastructure providing important civil services to the population or a facility or asset where the loss of which would increase destabilization and hostilities among belligerents. To provide security for key personnel may be in the form of a personal security detachment or security escorts when they must circulate through the local area. (See appendix D, section I of this publication for more information.
4-80. The Infantry platoon and squad may face a number of situations in which leaders need to conduct negotiations. There are two general types of negotiations, situational and planned. Units conduct situational negotiations in response to a requirement for on-the-spot discussion and resolution of a specific issue or problem. For example, a unit is patrolling its area of operation when a local official approaches it; the local official wishes to discuss an assault that occurred in the area. Units conduct planned negotiations when they foresee a problem, or identify a situation that must be resolved through advanced planning and/or coordination. For example, the platoon leader conducts a coordination meeting, otherwise known as key leader engagement, between leaders of two belligerent groups to determine route clearance responsibilities.
4-81. At the Infantry platoon and squad level, situational negotiations are far more common than the planned type. In fact, employment in stability requires the leader, his subordinate leaders, and other Soldiers to conduct some form of negotiations almost daily. This requires them to have a thorough understanding of the ROE.
4-82. Infantry platoon and squad members apply this working knowledge to the process of discussing and, whenever possible, resolving issues or problems that may arise between opposing parties, including the platoon itself. A critical aspect of this knowledge is the negotiator’s ability to recognize that the options under the ROE and rules of interaction are exhausted and turns the discussion over to a higher authority. Negotiations continue at progressive levels of authority until the issue is resolved.
The following vignette discusses negotiation tactics. - SELECT HERE
TASKS THE PLATOON CAN SUPPORT FOR OTHER FORCES
4-83. The Infantry platoon can support other forces by providing security force assistance, focus on IED defeat, and support to civil affairs operations. Each are describe below.
SECURITY FORCES ASSISTANCE
4-84. Security force assistance is defined as—the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Consistent with DOD policy for security force assistance, the Army develops, maintains, and institutionalizes the capabilities of its personnel to support DOD efforts to organize, train, equip, and advise foreign security forces and relevant supporting institutions.
4-85. Security forces are duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (JP 3-22) When directed to do so in accordance with appropriate legal authorities, Army forces conduct security force assistance activities in support of combatant commanders’ campaign plans and national objectives.
4-86. Military personnel should avoid confusing security force assistance and security assistance. Security assistance is a set of programs, authorized by law, that allow the United States to transfer defense articles, training, and services to partner nations. Security force assistance often works in conjunction with security assistance programs, but the focus of security force assistance is on building of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Security force assistance encompasses various activities related to the organizing, training, advising, equipping, and assessing of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions, from tactical to ministerial levels.
4-87. These activities contribute to unified action to generate, employ, and sustain foreign security forces . Foreign security forces are forces, including but not limited to, military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel, that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission. (FM 3-22) Security force assistance activities are conducted primarily to assist host nations build the capacity to defend against internal, external, and transnational threats to stability. However, DOD may also conduct security force assistance to assist host nations to defend against external threats; contribute to multinational operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise a nation’s security forces or supporting institutions.
4-88. It is DOD policy that security force assistance is a subset of DOD overall security cooperation initiatives and that security force assistance activities directly increase the capacity or capability of foreign security forces or their supporting institutions. Security force assistance consists of those security cooperation activities tied directly to the security capability and capacity of foreign security forces . Security assistance programs, with their associated resources and authorities, can provide a means to conduct some security force assistance tasks.
4-89. Other forms of security force assistance—specifically, advising in a hostile environment and other activities geared toward assisting a partner nation engaged in conflict—are performed by U.S. forces using resources and authorities specially provided to DOD for employment in support of combat operations. Global train-and-equip funding to support the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example. (Refer to FM 3-22 for more information).
Note. Soldiers should be trained and would benefit the unit if they receive training on cultural, local customs, and courtesies.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
4-90. These activities occur in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations to facilitate military operations in an effort to influence and support U.S. national objectives. Civil affairs operations and civil-military operations involve direct interaction with indigenous populations and institutions. Both civil-military operations and civil affairs operations focus on the indigenous population and institutions to create a favorable civil environment for military operations.
TASKS THE PLATOON MONITORS
4-91. The platoon can monitor and assist in civil-military operations and other enablers performing CMO, that include MISO, Special Operations Forces, legal support, public affairs, engineer, transportation, health service support, military police, security forces, and maneuver units. (Refer to FM 3-57 for more information.)
4-92. Tactical-level CMO include support of stakeholders at local levels, and promoting the legitimacy and effectiveness of U.S. presence and operations among locals, while minimizing friction between the military and the civilian organizations in the field. These may include local security operations, processing and movement of displaced civilians, project management and project nomination, civil reconnaissance, and basic HSS. (Refer to JP 3-57 for further information.)
4-93. Civil affairs operations are those military operations planned, supported, or executed by civil affairs forces that─
Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present.
Require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector.
Involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of CMO. They involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas usually the responsibility of civil government. These activities are fundamental to executing stability tasks.
4-94. Stability emphasizes nonlethal, constructive actions by Soldiers working among noncombatants. In stability, civil affairs forces work with and through host-nation agencies and other civilian organizations to enhance the host-nation government‘s legitimacy. Often, civil affairs teams work with or alongside the Infantry rifle platoon and squad during stability. A framework for evaluating civil considerations is ASCOPE. (Refer to ADRP 6-0 for further information.) Each consideration is described as follows─
Structures. Describe the man-made structures in which the people live and work; determine those having cultural, religious, and economic significance.
Capabilities. Determine the ability of various groups to influence the area of operations and the rest of the population relative to their possible intent to do so-determine economic and military potential given the areas and infrastructure
Organizations. Determine what informal and formal social, religious, familial or political organizations exist and their intentions, purposes, and resources .
People. Determine how the population aligns with organizations and one another; determine if they are likely to be supportive, detrimental, or neutral to the unit‘s mission.
Events. Create significant population event template and determine if future activity can be predicted based on pattern analysis.
4-95. Monitor compliance with an agreement involves observing belligerents and working with them to ensure they meet the conditions of one or more applicable agreements. (See section II of this chapter for more information.) Expeditionary forensic collection missions. Involves tasked support to the collection and analysis of materials in an area of operation, applies to both IED and non-IED events. Includes collecting, identifying, and labeling portable items for future exploitation, and the collection of fingerprints, DNA, and other biometric data from nontransportable items at a scene, such as a bomb maker’s table and chairs. (Refer to ATP 2-22.82 for more information.)
4-96. Support relief operations in a foreign country using the Army to respond with a wide array of capabilities and services to aid authorities in the following types of actions: protecting public health, restoring public order, assisting in disaster recovery, alleviating large-scale suffering, and protecting critical infrastructure. (See chapter 4 of this publication for more information.)
Transition to the Offense
Transition to the Defense
Transfer of Authority
Transition to Civilian/Host-Nation Security Force Control
4-97. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities between the elements of unified land operations, such as from offense to stability, also involves a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution to maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. The force is naturally more vulnerable during transitions, thus requiring leaders to establish clear conditions for their execution. Transitions may create unexpected opportunities; they also may make forces vulnerable to enemy threats.
TRANSITION TO THE OFFENSE
4-98. During stability operations, there may be instances where units must transition quickly back to the offense against irregular forces or defense to defeat counterattacks.
4-99. Under unified land operations, forces conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Offensive and defensive tasks focus on defeating enemy forces. Stability tasks focus on the establishment of a safe and secure environment to facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.
4-100. Security components of an operation, including area security, pertain to actions taken to protect the force. They are associated with the offense and defense. Civil security and civil control are stability tasks. Army leaders expect a mission of protecting and providing security for a population to be expressed in terms of civil security or civil control.
A soldier pulls security while others conduct interviews.
TRANSITION TO THE DEFENSE
4-101. Leaders must ensure transitions from defensive to stability tasks and vice versa are planned. For example, it may be tactically wise for leaders to plan a defensive contingency with on-order offensive missions if certain stability conditions could deteriorate. Leaders within the platoon must be fully trained to recognize activities, which would initiate this transition. Indicators to transition include:
Increased insurgent activity, strength, and combat power.
Increased insurgent movements.
An increase in civilian attacks.
Upcoming key host nation events.
Concentration of insurgent activities in local or adjoining areas of operations.
Soldier pulls security during a senior leader engagement.
TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
4-102. Often during stability, a relief in place is referred to as a transfer of authority . In addition to the normal responsibilities of a relief, leaders and Soldiers also must deal with civilians or coalition partners. During stability, units generally know whether they will be relieved at the end of their tour. Planning for a transfer of authority begins as soon as the unit occupies the area of operation.
4-103. Before the transfer of authority, the departing unit develops a continuity book with the necessary information on the area of operation. The book should include lessons learned, details about the populace, village and patrol reports, updated maps, and photographs; anything helping the incoming unit master the outgoing unit’s operational environment. Computerized databases are suitable. Leaders should ensure these continuity books are updated during the unit’s tour of duty. This extensive effort reduces casualties and increase the current and succeeding units’ efficiency and knowledge of operations.
4-104 A consistent theme from recent operations is the importance of the transition training (right seat/left seat rides) with incoming Soldiers during a transfer of authority. A detailed and programmed transfer of authority allows Soldiers to learn the culture and work with host nation personnel during the deployment. Typical training during the relief includes:
Use of theater-unique equipment not available before the transfer of authority.
Enemy tactics, techniques and procedures for improvised explosive devices specific to the area of operations.
Personal meetings with nongovernmental organizations, contractors, interpreters, informants, and local police operating in the unit area of operations.
Negotiation techniques with local tribal, religious and government officials.
Operations and intelligence handover of databases, plans, products, and briefings.
Information collection procedures, processes and policies.
TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN/HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCE CONTROL
4-105. During long-term security force assistance, conditions determine the rotation of in-theater units. Time is not the only governing factor. The overall authority for handoff and subsequent transfer of authority lies with the leader ordering the change. The authority for determining the handoff process lies with the incoming leader assuming responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect conditions under which the mission will continue. (Refer to ADRP 3-07 and FM 3-22 for more information.)
4-106. Changes in the operational environment may require reshaping force packages as situations change. In addition, internal administrative concerns might prompt or support the leader’s decision to rotate units. Regardless, mission handoff is necessary and defined as the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity.
4-107. Although intended for a direct handoff between U.S. units, Infantry leaders must make specific considerations along with METT-TC when making a handoff to a multinational force. For units relieved of a function by a government agency, procedures typically entail longer handoff times and more complex coordination. However, the other areas of consideration still apply and may in fact be a greater issue for an agency. Outgoing units that have past, present, or future projects planned with agencies prepare to transfer these projects to responsible agents in the incoming unit.